By Benjamin M. Friedman, Michael Woodford
V. 3A. The Mechanism-design method of financial conception / Neil Wallace -- New monetarist economics: types / Stephen Williamson and Randall Wright -- cash and inflation: a few severe concerns / Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson -- Foundations: info and adjustment. Rational inattention and fiscal economics / Christopher A. Sims -- Imperfect info and mixture offer / N. Gregory Mankiw and Ricardo Reis -- Microeconomic proof on price-setting / Peter J. Klenow and Benjamin A. Malin -- versions of the financial transmission mechanism. DSGE types for financial coverage research / Lawrence J. Christiano, Mathias Trabandt, and Karl Walentin -- How has the financial transmission mechanism developed through the years? / Jean Boivin, Michael T. Kiley, and Frederic S. Mishkin -- Inflation endurance / Jeffrey C. Fuhrer -- financial coverage and unemployment / Jordi Gali -- monetary intermediation and credits coverage in company cycle research / Mark Gertler and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki -- monetary intermediaries and financial economics / Tobias Adrian and Hyun tune Shin -- v. 3B. Optical financial coverage / Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martin Uribe -- optimum financial stabilization coverage / Michael Woodford -- basic and powerful ideas for financial coverage / John B. Taylor and John C. Williams -- Optical financial coverage in open economics / Giancarlo Corsetti, Luca Dedola, and Sylvain Leduc -- Constraints on financial coverage. The interplay among financial and monetary coverage / Matthew Canzoneri, Robert Cumby, and Behzad Diba -- The politics of economic coverage / Alberto Alesina and Andrea Stella -- Inflation expectancies, adaptive studying and optimum financial coverage / Vitor Gaspar, Frank Smets, and David Vestin -- short of robustness in macroeconomics / Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas J. Sargent -- financial coverage in perform. financial coverage regimes and financial functionality: the old list, 1979-2008 / Luca Benati and Charles Goodhart -- Inflation focusing on / Lars E.O. Svensson -- The functionality of other financial regimes / Laurence Ball -- Implementation of economic coverage: how do imperative banks set rates of interest? / Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner -- financial coverage in rising markets / Jeffrey Frankel
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Additional info for Handbook of Monetary Economics, Volume 3A
In this section, I comment on some directions in which it could be generalized. 1 Capital An unrealistic and, therefore, seemingly troublesome feature of the illustrative model is the absence of forms of wealth other than currency. Indeed, in the inside-money version, if money is treated as a liability of m people, then net wealth is zero. Here I describe a way to remedy that unrealistic feature by introducing putty-clay capital into the model. In the previous version, the production technology in pairwise meetings has a single input, labor or effort.
A discussion along these lines was originally meant to be included here, but to keep the Handbook chapter focused, on the advice of the editors, we moved that material to the companion paper. New Monetarist Economics Models New Monetarism encompasses a body of research on monetary theory and policy, and on banking, financial intermediation, payments, and asset markets, that has occurred over the last few decades. In monetary economics, this includes the seminal work using overlapping generations models by Lucas (1972) and some of the contributors to the Models of Monetary Economies volume edited by Kareken and Wallace (1980), although antecedents exist, including Samuelson (1958).
Any cooperative defection has both people becoming n people at the next date with both monies issued by those people worthless. Hence, in any defection their total money holdings are limited by the money holdings they bring into the meeting and two m people cannot make each other rich by issuing money to each other. The restriction implied by the possibility of cooperative defection is that their payoffs (the profile of the current utility payoff plus the discounted continuation value for the producer and the consumer) must be weakly outside the payoff frontier of a meeting between two n people with the same profile of money holdings.
Handbook of Monetary Economics, Volume 3A by Benjamin M. Friedman, Michael Woodford