By Ted Lindblom, Stefan Sjögren, Magnus Willesson (eds.)
Read Online or Download Governance, Regulation and Bank Stability PDF
Best banking books
The ebook makes an attempt to offer a accomplished description and testable conception of the complex, yet no longer unintelligible method of bank-firm relationships within the dynamic atmosphere of a steadily deregulated monetary industry. It offers either concept and empirical facts that shut bank-firm relationships bring about a decrease fraction of financial institution finance.
- Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money
- Credit Scoring, Response Modelling and Insurance Rating: A Practical Guide to Forecasting Consumer Behaviour
- Advanced Fixed Income Analysis
- Financial Markets and Organizational Technologies: System Architectures, Practices and Risks in the Era of Deregulation
- Stock Message Boards: A Quantitative Approach to Measuring Investor Sentiment
Extra resources for Governance, Regulation and Bank Stability
Song, and A. V. Thakor (2013) ‘Correlated leverage and its ramifications’, Working Paper, Washington University in St. Louis, July. Kane, E. (1990) ‘Principal-agent problems in S&L salvage’, The Journal of Finance, 45, 755–764. Keys, B. , T. Mukherjee, A. Seru and V. Vig (2010) ‘Did securitization lead to lax screening? Evidence from subprime loans’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(1), 307–362. Kupiec, P. and C. D. Ramirez (2013) ‘Bank failures and the cost of systemic risk: Evidence from 1900–1930’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(3), 285–307.
The expected sign for LEV refers to that variable when considering it as a control variable. The expected sign for LIQUID refers to the liquidity ratio, so the expected sign is positive when considering the liquidity risk. 3 Econometric models The primary estimation method is the generalized least square (GLS) random effect (RE) technique (Baltagi and Wu, 1999). This technique is robust to first-order autoregressive disturbances (if any) within unbalanced-panels and cross-sectional correlation and/or heteroskedasticity across panels.
4. Impose higher capital requirements in the shadow banking system (repos, money market funds, investment banks, insurance companies, 16 Anjan V. , CDS), and regulate institutions by their activities rather than by what they call themselves. 5. Permit broader ownership of banks in order to allow equity-based governance to work more effectively. 6. Consider some variant of the Belgian experiment of ‘levelling the tax playing field’ between debt and equity by allowing tax deductibility either of dividends or of a notional return on the book value of equity.
Governance, Regulation and Bank Stability by Ted Lindblom, Stefan Sjögren, Magnus Willesson (eds.)